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Abstract 
A new development in the field of deception 
detection is been the development of rapid, non-
contact tools for automated detection. This research 
in progress paper describes a method for assessing 
the robustness of eye tracker-based deception 
detection to countermeasures employed by 
knowledgeable participants. 
1. Introduction 
Following the events of September 11, 2001, 
securing the US border has become a focal issue. As 
more people attempt to enter the country, manpower 
and current processes are proving insufficient to 
process the ever-increasing volume of travelers. In 
order to deal with these constraints, more efficient 
methods of processing potential entrants are being 
evaluated. One of the methods currently under 
development is an automated-screening kiosk. Users 
interact with the kiosk, and the kiosk integrates and 
analyzes data from various sensors to provide 
automated assistance in detecting deception [6]. An 
eye tracker is one of those sensors, and was recently 
shown to be effective in detecting deception using a 
Guilty Knowledge Test [7, 19]. 
One of the primary assumptions to this point in 
eye tracker-based deception detection research has 
been participants who are unaware of the nature of 
the eye tracking tests. In laboratory environments this 
assumption can be taken for granted. Unfortunately it 
will not always hold in a real-world environment. 
Participants’ willingness to use the eye tracker could 
range from willing participation to belligerence. 
Additionally, participants may range from having no 
knowledge of the eye tracker to knowingly 
subverting the process. These differences could have 
a large impact on the ability to detect deception 
through eye behavior patterns. The same problems 
affect polygraph examinations [14]. While they may 
be able to reliably detect deception in willing 
participants, countermeasures can be employed to 
appear innocent [17]. 
Therefore, my research question for this study is 
the following: 
 RQ1: How do individuals employing 
countermeasures differ from others in their 
eye movement patterns? 
2. Eyes as Deception Cues 
One of the most important issues in rapid 
credibility assessment is this: how can we reliably 
and unobtrusively detect deception? One of the tools 
currently under investigation for lie detection is the 
eye tracking camera [2]. Eye tracking cameras can be 
used for many different purposes in detecting 
deception because of the wealth of cues offered by 
the eye. The eye offers at least three different 
mechanisms that could potentially indicate deception: 
fixation points, blinks, and pupil dilation. These are 
important as they are likely related to the cognitive 
processes common to deception [22, 7, 8]. 
Eye gaze patterns are measured in various ways, 
one of which is fixation points. An analysis of these 
fixation points during a Guilty Knowledge Test was 
recently demonstrated to be an effective method of 
distinguishing deceptive participants from truthful 
ones [7]. The fixation patterns of deceptive 
participants were significantly different from those of 
innocent participants. Nonetheless, none of the 
participants were given information about what they 
eye tracker would be looking for. Knowledgeable 
participants may be able to modify their gaze patterns 
to appear innocent. 
Two other eye-related cues of deception are 
blinks and pupil dilation. The blink rate was linked to 
cognitive effort, and blink latency (the time between 
the presentation of the stimulus and the first blink) 
was shown to be significantly different for the guilty 
knowledge than for other objects [15].  
Pupil dilation has also been experimentally 
demonstrated to be effective at detecting deception 
[8, 5]. Similar to other psychophysiological cues of 
deception, pupil diameter is theorized to change 
based on the cognitive effort of the individual. 
Deceivers undergo additional cognitive processes 
compared to truth tellers because they must 
simultaneously think of the true and the false answer 
[16]. This additional cognitive load causes the pupil 
diameter of deceptive respondents to increase relative 
to truth tellers [8]. 
  
 
3. Deception Theory 
All of these physiological cues of deception are 
based upon the underlying assumption that liars 
behave differently than truth-tellers. Deception 
theories have attributed the differing behavior to 
many potential causes. Zuckerman at al. [25] propose 
arousal and cognitive complexity as causal 
explanations for the increased pupil dilation and 
blinking associated with lying. Liars are in general 
more agitated and more cognitively taxed during the 
lying task. The different influences liars must 
confront while lying will lead to the leakage of cues 
while they attempt to deceive. Interpersonal 
deception theory [1] states that interpersonal 
communication is a complex task, and that the 
process of deception compounds the complexity. 
For our purposes, deception can be defined as a 
message knowledgeably conveyed to lead the 
receiver to a false belief or conclusion [1, 9]. The 
complexity that comes with conveying the 
manipulated story causes an increased cognitive load 
on the deceiver [16]. Additionally, interpersonal 
deception creates the need for liars to monitor 
themselves to appear honest [4], and their targets to 
verify whether they are believed [1]. The emotional 
strain that occurs when liars experience detection 
apprehension, or the worry that they will be found 
out, contributes further to the effort differential 
between liars and truth-tellers [10]. This cognitive 
and emotional differential is the underlying principle 
behind the psychophysiological detection of 
deception [16, 24]. 
4. Countermeasures 
The detection of deception relies on the 
assumption that not all behaviors can be controlled 
simultaneously [1]. The inadvertent behavior that 
allows deception detection, either computationally or 
manually, is called leakage [11]. 
The ability to reliably detect deception has been 
a problem significantly complicated by the use of 
countermeasures on the part of the deceivers [17, 18]. 
Countermeasures are purposeful techniques 
employed by guilty participants in order to appear 
innocent [14]. By simulating the effort necessary for 
deception during non-deceptive responses, 
participants were able to cloud the results of 
polygraph examinations. Two types of behavioral 
countermeasures are possible: physical and mental. 
Using physical processes such as biting the tongue or 
pressing one’s toes against the floor, nearly 50% of 
guilty participants were able to successfully fool a 
polygraph examiner into believing they were 
innocent [18]. Participants were also able to fool 
examiners by increasing their cognitive effort during 
irrelevant responses by counting backward by 7 from 
a number greater than 200 [17]. All of these 
countermeasures were employed by students with no 
more than 30 minutes of training. The ease with 
which the students were able to pass the polygraph 
examination draws attention to the need for 
validation of any psychophysiological measure of 
deception. 
In order to understand the possibilities and 
limitations of deception detection technology, we 
must examine the possibility that knowledgeable, 
deceptive persons may attempt to exploit its 
weaknesses to appear truthful [14]. The polygraph, a 
very intrusive, time-consuming test for deception, has 
been subjected to numerous tests of its effectiveness 
in the face of participant countermeasures [12, 14, 13, 
17, 18]. Understanding the effects of these 
countermeasures has assisted researchers in 
developing measures to mitigate their effectiveness 
[13]. If eye gaze behavior is to be used to detect 
deception, we must examine the possibility of 
countermeasures employed by subjects who do not 
wish to be detected. 
 H1: Countermeasures reduce deception 
detection. 
 H1a: Countermeasures will reduce the pupil 
dilation change on a relevant stimulus. 
 H1b: Countermeasures will reduce the blink 
rate change on a relevant stimulus. 
 H1c: Countermeasures will reduce time 
spent looking at the modified portion of a 
relevant stimulus. 
5. Research Method 
To study the proposed research model, two pilot 
studies and a laboratory experiment will be 
conducted. The guilty vs. not guilty condition will be 
manipulated via a simulated mock crime. Eye 
behavior will be measured via an eye tracker. 
5.1. Experimental Design and Procedure 
I propose to study the eye gaze patterns of naïve 
vs. deceptive participants using an experiment. The 
experiment will involve one control group and three 
treatment groups. The control group would pass 
through a screening-like kiosk interaction wherein 
their eye gaze patterns will be tracked as they view 
several images. The first experimental condition will 
be a treatment where participants complete a task 
similar to the bomb-making experiment conducted by 
Derrick, Moffit, and Nunamaker [7]. The participants 
  
 
will then be shown the same images as the control 
group. One of the images will be related to the bomb 
they constructed before passing through the kiosk 
interaction. Their eye gaze behavior will be tracked 
using the eye tracker. 
Two more treatment conditions will be 
composed of individuals who will be told about the 
eye tracker and given basic information about the 
Guilty Knowledge Test. They will also be trained in 
countermeasures proven to be successful in defeating 
a polygraph examination. These participants will then 
be instructed to subvert the eye tracking process and 
appear innocent. They will be divided into two sub-
groups: guilty and innocent. Innocent participants 
will have nothing to conceal as they interact with the 
eye tracker. Guilty participants will participate in the 
bomb-making exercise. The innocent participants 
will provide a useful second control group to 
determine if knowledge of countermeasures and 
procedures can make even innocent participants 
appear guilty. A breakdown of the experimental 
conditions is shown in Table 1. All participants will 
be offered a $10 reward for an innocent judgment. 
This should serve as a motivation, and raise the 
stakes for the deception [20]. 
 
Table 1 - Experimental conditions 
 Bomb No Bomb 







The calibration of the eye tracker will be 
conducted using an auto-calibration procedure to 
reduce the risk of hypothesis guessing among 
participants in conditions I and II. Hypothesis 
guessing occurs when participants in an experiment 
guess what experimenters are attempting to study [3]. 
Auto-calibration is the process of establishing 
reference points for participants’ gaze without 
explicitly asking them to calibrate the machine.  
Because countermeasures have never been 
studied in the context of an eye tracker, pilot testing 
will be conducted to provide preliminary results and 
provide a basis for prediction in the final experiment. 
Additionally, the countermeasures initially used will 
be the same as those employed in previous polygraph 
experiments. Pilot tests will allow an initial 
assessment of the countermeasures employed, and 
allow the development of new countermeasures if 
necessary. The specific patterns of behavior present 
in participants employing countermeasures will 
provide exploratory insight into the eye behavior and 
indicate theories which may be useful in predicting 
future results. In addition, the manipulation for 
conditions III and IV will need to be tested to ensure 
that instructions are clear. 
5.2. Countermeasures Training 
The participants in the countermeasures 
treatment groups will receive training on the 
countermeasures reported to be successful by [17] 
and [18]. Specifically, they will be taught to bite their 
tongues (not enough to cause serious pain), press 
their toes against the floor, and count backward by 
seven. They will be instructed to employ the mental 
countermeasures throughout the interaction, as this 
has been demonstrated to be more effective than 
item-specific mental countermeasures [14]. In this 
way, they will be able to manipulate their 
physiological response to reduce the differences 
between relevant and irrelevant stimuli. 
Participants will also be trained on the workings 
of the Guilty Knowledge Test [19]. They will be told 
that the GKT works by differentiating between 
irrelevant and relevant stimuli and that five irrelevant 
stimuli will be presented. Participants will also be 
told about the eye gaze portion, and that they should 
avoid looking at the relevant section for too long. 
They will also be instructed not to completely avoid 
looking at the relevant section, as this would still 
allow the differentiation of deceivers. 
Finally, participants will be given motivational 
instructions to increase their confidence in 
successfully employing their countermeasures and 
deceiving the eye tracker. They will be told that, 
despite the accuracy of deception detection, 
intelligent people are able to defeat these machines 
with high levels of success [23]. 
6. Expected Results 
Following the experiment, three different sets of 
data will first be analyzed individually, and then 
combined to determine the effectiveness of 
countermeasures against eye tracker-based deception 
detection. 
6.1. Blinks 
The first metric used to compare guilty vs. 
innocent participants in this experiment was the blink 
rate. After the visual stimulus is presented, the blink 
rate was expected to change for the relevant stimulus 
versus the irrelevant stimuli. The time following the 
display of visual stimulus will be divided into 
segments of 200 ms, and blink rate in each segment 
will be compared among groups. It is expected that 
early after the relevant stimulus is presented, the 
  
 
blink rate will be lower for guilty groups, but guilty 
groups will have a higher peak blink rate after 
approximately 4 seconds. The comparison between 
groups will be done using ANOVA. It is anticipated 
that the guilty group employing countermeasures will 
appear more like the innocent control group than the 
guilty control group. The innocent countermeasures 
participants will likely appear guiltier than the 
innocent control group. 
6.2. Pupil dilation 
Pupil dilation and pupillary response will be 
compared among the groups using ANOVA. The 
primary measure will be the difference in pupil 
dilation immediately after the relevant stimulus is 
presented versus the average for the irrelevant 
stimuli. It is anticipated that guilty participants will 
have a larger change in pupil dilation than innocent 
participants. However, guilty participants who 
employ countermeasures should be able to influence 
their pupil dilation during irrelevant stimuli, thus 
reducing the change for the relevant stimulus. In this 
way, they will be able to appear innocent. The 
innocent participants employing countermeasures 
will probably experience no change, and thus appear 
innocent. 
6.3. Gaze Behavior 
Once again, the difference between guilty and 
innocent participants will be analyzed using 
ANOVA. The measurement in this segment will be 
done by identifying a target area of the relevant 
image. Here, the differentiation will have to be done 
between groups. Whereas blink rate and pupil 
dilation can be measured as a comparison of relevant 
versus irrelevant stimuli, the gaze behavior pattern is 
by nature a between-groups comparison. By 
displaying a modified image of the bomb participants 
built, the guilty participants’ gaze will be drawn 
significantly more toward the modified region of the 
image. One-way ANOVA will be used to compare 
the time spent looking at the modified region for 
guilty and innocent participants. It is anticipated that 
subject with a knowledge of the eye tracker’s 
workings will be able to appear innocent by reducing 
the amount of time looking at the modified region. 
Innocent participants employing countermeasures are 
not expected to be significantly different from those 
without countermeasures training. 
7. Discussion 
As the use of eye trackers for deception detection 
becomes more common, it is important that 
researchers and practitioners understand the 
limitations. These results should indicate that simple 
countermeasures such as pressing ones toes against 
the floor or counting backward by seven was 
sufficient to significantly reduce the deception 
differentiation capability of an eye tracker. One area 
for future research is the employment of counter-
countermeasures similar to those used in polygraph 
examinations [18]. For example, a force plate placed 
underneath the participants during the eye tracker 
interaction may be sufficient to detect use 
employment of physical countermeasures such as 
pressing toes against the floor. Additionally, further 
analysis of reactions immediately after a relevant 
stimulus is displayed may prove to be effective 
regardless of countermeasures due to the orienting 
reflex [21]. The subconscious orientation toward a 
stimulus immediately after it is presented may allow 
researchers to detect deception before 
countermeasures can be consciously applied. 
The addition of these simple techniques 
highlights the need for further research integrating 
more cues of deception into a rapid, non-contact 
screening device [6]. The integration of linguistic, 
vocalic, and rigidity analyses will increase the 
difficulty of overcoming deception detection by 
adding more facets of behavior that must be 
manipulated or controlled. This study is limited to the 
use of eye-based deception detection. Future research 
could examine the use of multiple sensors to increase 
the difficulty of successfully fooling the deception 
detection system. 
8. Conclusion 
The purpose of this research is to examine the 
limitations of eye tracker-based deception detection 
when faced with mental and physical 
countermeasures. The experiment to be conducted 
demonstrates that countermeasures allow people to 
effectively defeat the eye tracking deception 
detection process. Further research is necessary to 
integrate additional non-contact deception detection 
mechanisms in order to increase the robustness of 
these tests. 
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